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Peter Matussek 
Literature as a Technique of Recollection 
 
There is a caricature of Marcel Proust in which the despairing writer is 
consoled by a friend saying, 'Aber, aber, mon cher Marcel, nun versuchen Sie 
sich doch zu erinnern, wo Sie die Zeit verloren haben.'1 
Literature in general, not only A La Recherche du Temps Perdu, deals with 
a different form of memory than that of mnemonics, in which the hints of 
places lead to a retrieval of what has been stored there before. Nevertheless it 
is difficult to pinpoint the criteria that make this difference. How does 
literature transcend the technologically limited sense of memory in terms of a 
storage and retrieval system? 
First of all, we have to realize that the poetics of memory is not an obscure 
quality soaring above the technical use of classical mnemonics. 'Story' and 
'storage' have the same roots, as Thomas Wägenbauer pointed out.2 And it was 
a poet, Simonides of Keos, who is said to have been the inventor of 
mnemotechniques. The written word—Plato later straightens out for once and 
for all—is caught up in the task of data storing per se. Paradoxically, however, 
Plato's criticism of the hypomnemata which cause the facility of anamnesis to 
wither away, is passed on to us in writing. Is this a case of a performative self-
contradiction? Is the entire history of literary remembering perhaps such a 
contradiction? 
Indeed, it is—in a specific way. Literature can be seen as a technique of 
deconstructing its own mnemonic function, and this is what I call the 
technique of recollection. What makes it separate from bare mnemonic devices 
is the opening of the textual spaces in which knowledge is stored, enabling the 
 
1  F.W. Bernstein. 
2 Wägenbauer, Thomas (see his ISSEI-paper 'Limited Recollection inc. the Romantic Element 
in Cognitive Science').  
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recipient to 'read between the lines'. As Renate Lachmann puts it, echoing 
Julia Kristeva, 'The memory of a text is its intertextuality.'3 This can express 
itself in different ways whose underlying principle is the awakening of an 
association—a hint at something which is absent—in the mesh of literary 
texts. In the following I wish to demonstrate the exemplary role of 
intertextuality as a technique of recollection in Plato and then draw a line from 
the dawn of literary remembering techniques to their dusk—the loss of literary 
intertextuality, technically brought about by the hypertext. 
 
Plato and the Origins of Intertextuality 
 
Our starting point was the question of how Plato could unfold his criticism of 
writing through writing, i.e. how he could use the medium itself to overcome 
its own limits. In Phaedrus, Plato clearly states that writing paralyses the 
activities of remembering by means of prothetic substitution. There is little 
point in asking psychologists if this is really the case. Their findings are 
ambiguous as can be seen, for example, in two famous cases of memory 
malfunction described by Alexander Lurija. These are the Ôvast memoryÕ of 
the mnemopath Schereschewski who suffered from the flood of remembered 
images, and the amnesia of the brain-damaged Sassezki, whose mental aphasia 
had lacerated the cosmos of his memories. One wrote to forget, the other wrote 
to remember. Both failed.4 We therefore have to differentiate and address the 
question of how writing is used in order to find out under what circumstances 
it promotes or, as the case may be, hinders, remembering or forgetting. 
In Schereschewski's preoccupation with freeing himself from the over-
determination of his memory, we can see an attempt to verify the hypothesis of 
the Phaedrus-dialogue, namely that the process of writing enables us to forget. 
As Schereschewski says, 'Writing something down means I'll know I won't 
have to remember it.'5 
 
3 Lachmann, Renate. Gedächtnis und Literatur. Frankfurt am Main, 1990, p. 35. 
4  Lurija, Alexander R. Der Mann, dessen Welt in Scherben ging. Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1992. 
5 Lurija, Alexander R. The Mind of a Mnemonist. Cambridge, London, 1987, p. 69.  
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What appeared to the mnemonist as salvation is exactly the effect Plato had 
anticipated in Phaedrus 275a. The passage is repeatedly cited by those who 
claim that Plato is a radical opponent of writing who privileged the oral 
medium to avoid the side effects of this deceptive pharmakon.6 I do not think 
this claim can stand up to criticism. Contrary to the popular belief that Plato's 
dialogue plays oral speech out against writing in the interests of recollection, I 
interpret Plato as placing the line of argument crossways to the opposition of 
both media: Both can either promote or hinder the process of anamnesis 
depending on how they are used. In a double sense poor Phaedrus takes on the 
role of negative exemplary. He has just heard a lecture of the rhetorician 
Lysias and requested this in the written version so that he can learn it off by 
heart. Now he wishes to try it out on Socrates to see whether he can do as if it 
emerges as new from his recollection. But the declamation falls flat. The 
skeptical philosopher who becomes suspicious at the mention of the name 
Lysias glimpses the notes under Phaedrus's cloak and suggests the amateur 
mnemonist would be better-off reading the original. 
What is problematized here is the purely mechanical reproduction of 
writing and speech. Plato had already introduced the alternative model in 
Meno: By clever questioning Socrates managed to decipher the slave's false, 
mechanical answers until he had reached the mental state of aporia, the 
precondition of true anamnesis (84a-b). 
Thus, destroying the false belief that one can speak well is opening the 
mind for truly speaking well. This is also demonstrated in Phaedrus: Socrates 
gives a better speech than Lysias because he does not reproduce preconceived 
rhetorical knowledge. He leaves it up to the muses, the daughters of 
Mnemosyne, to decide whether he can deliver his theme convincingly or not 
(237a). That is to say, he faces up to his own aporia. The opening for that 
which is not already contained in memory sets an anamnetic process in 
 
6 See Assmann, Aleida and Assmann, Jan. 'Schrift,' in Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie, eds. Ritter, Joachim & Gründer, Karlfried, Vol. 8. Basel and Stuttgart 1992, pp. 
1417-1431, here pp. 1424 f.  
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motion. This process is for Socrates a sort of 'madness that is heaven-sent' 
(244a): the soul's undistorted recollection of beauty once beheld (249a-250c). 
Analagous to this example of good speech are the utterances that follow on 
from it about 'how to write well' (258d). The criteria remain the same: By 
means of the respective medium it is necessary to overcome its purely 
mnemonic usage in order to allow the creative process of recollection to arise. 
It is not paradoxical that Plato should have written the Phaedrus-dialogue 
down. It is instead the logical implementation of the methods it elucidates for 
producing an aporetic situation. When Plato writes that people's 'trust in 
writing É will discourage the use of their own memory within them', the 
discredited medium appears, due to the self-destructive manner of its use, as 
the means of its own transcendence. 
In the course of the dialogue, this manner of use is subjected to 
considerable variation. I am indeed convinced that all three models of 
intertextuality mentioned by Renate Lachmann7 are contained in Plato's 
dialogue: 
The participatory repetition and continuational writing of previous texts is 
carried out in extraordinarily numerous allusions and reminiscences that are 
explicit and to an even greater extent, implicit. 
The writing against forerunner texts in the sense of tropes shows itself in 
the socratic opposing models to Lysias. They undermine the existing text in 
two steps. Before Socrates can get around to the speech he sets out to 
achieve—namely the countering and surpassing of the older text—he delivers 
a lecture that picks up on Lysias' argumentation and exceeds it. 
In doing so, it establishes the necessary distance for the intended 
transformation of the forerunner text. Socrates' second speech now rebuilds the 
pre-ordained line of argument in order to prove its opposite. However, this 
upturning of the argument exposes its own construct-character and relativizes 
itself: At the end Socrates excuses himself to Eros for his overly poetic use of 
language which had been in order 'to please Phaedrus' (257a). The subversive 
 
7 Lachmann, ibid., p. 38 ff.  
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play with its own credibility affects the didactically blended-in myths, for 
instance of the Cicadas. Socrates reprimands his eager conversation partner for 
being unfamiliar with this educational heritage (259b). The accused, of course, 
has had no chance to redeem himself as knowledgeable since the story has just 
been invented. 
Plato's self-relativization does not spare the representation of his own 
fundamental principles. Thus Socrates' first speech initially reads as a didactic 
demonstration of the journey through aporia to anamnesis: Not knowing what 
to say, 'under compulsion' (237a), he starts to speak, to suddenly admit that he 
is 'divinely inspired' (238c). The 'Aha-effect' of the learned Socrates transpires 
however to be a misconstrual. The impressively demonstrated act of 
remembering was a parodistic simulation. 
I see the specific mark of platonic intertextuality to be such distancing 
from the mediality of representation via this very means of representation. The 
point of the dialogue is that Lysias, the very master of oral speech, demands of 
his students the slave-like reproduction of his words while the vitality of the 
socratic counter-speech lies in the fact that it is constructed according to rules 
of written composition. The crucial difference is not the choice of the 
particular medium, but the transparency of the intermedial support-functions: 
Phaedrus carries his written notes of Lysias' speech 'under (his) cloak' (228d), 
while Plato openly shows Socrates' lecture to be a literary product. 
Writing, according to Plato, does therefore not necessarily harbor all the 
danger of forgetting recollection in the act of storing. Properly used, it can 
bring about remembering by subverting what is stored in it. Schereschewski's 
futile efforts at forgetting do not refute this theory. The mnemopath's notes are 
anti-hypomnemata—as is the Phaedrus-dialogue. Much to Schereschewski's 
chagrin, they bring themselves to memory by the energy of their will to bypass 
the automations of mnemonic aids. 
With its non-topographical and non-linear structure therefore, we can say 
that literature is a critical alternative to any data storage system that stays 
within the limits of a mnemonic device. Ironically, however, one of the most 
advanced data storage systems of our days, the hypertext, is based on this very  
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structure. One would be justified, therefore, in asking whether it is not, in fact, 
superior even to traditional literature by virtue of its ability to stimulate the 
process of recollection. 
 
Hypertext: The Termina(liza)tion of Intertextuality 
 
Phaedrus- is enjoying a huge wave of popularity among the theorists of new 
textuality. They praise Plato's dialogue-direction as the transcendence of linear 
textuality, at the same time criticizing the conversational form which they 
ascribe to this transcendence for being only pseudo-interactive. In this vein we 
can approach the following remark of David Bolter, 'The form invites the 
reader to participate in a conversation and then denies him or her full 
participation.'8 
Like David Bolter, many theorists of the new medium see the hypertext as 
the solution to this problem in the auspices of intertextuality. The same applies 
to David Kolb's Story Space with the title Socrates in the Labyrinth,9 that 
circles around the notion of 'intermediate structure' and interprets this as the 
heightened continuation of platonic motifs. He constructs a threefold structure 
in the history of the media, the crowning synthesis of which is almost 
automatically the hypertext. At the beginning is the oral dialogue in which 
Socrates confronts his conversational partners with alternatives that they have 
to decide on their own. The written text prevents this form of interaction from 
taking place, providing a release, however, from the situative context of the 
conversation, increasing the variability of the perspectives of reception. The 
hypertext heightens the advantages of both of its forerunner media while 
rendering their disadvantages inactive. Through the linking up of texts that are 
scattered into single isolated passages, the multiplicity of perspectives is 
exponentially enlarged. At the same time the reader can influence the course 
of the idea interactively as in an oral conversation. 
 
8 Writing Space, Hillsdale (NJ) 1991, p. 111. 
9 Watertown, 1995.  
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So much for the theory. What does the practice look like, the reading-
situation? Inexperienced readers clicking through hypertexts see themselves 
initially confronted with a freedom they are unable to deal with. They are put 
in the position of a theatre director who is totally unfamiliar with the drama he 
is about to direct. This leads to a situation in which the transition from aporia 
to anamnesis is pre-determined: After a certain amount of clicking around, the 
reader will have the déja-vu experience of a text-passage previously beheld. 
What I had to condense here is the problem with drawing a parallel 
between hypertextual interactivity and literary intertextuality. The 
omnipotence of the author—which did not have to wait for modern and 
postmodern texts to be challenged—is not further discredited by the hypertext, 
but restored. This omnipotence has merely become hard to identify as it has 
externalized itself in the algorithms of the textual mesh. In doing so, it has 
mercilessly reduced the free space for imaginative recollecting processes. 
Every action of the mouse-clicking reader pins his sense for virtuality down to 
factual contents. Therefore it is a misleading use of language to talk about the 
new objective medium in terms of virtual reality. The so-called hyperspace 
reduces precisely those spaces to pre-ordained text-variations in which 
intertextual structures can develop their dynamic. Every click contributes to 
turning a potential abundance of association into a desert of dissociation. 
Polyperspectivity degenerates into patchwork. 
With regard to the dissociative reading associated with hypertexts we can 
go on in this context to discuss its consequences for memory: These are 
similar to the symptoms suffered by Sassezki whose amnesia resulted from a 
fragmented linguistic understanding, i.e. from the loss of the ability to 
understand 'complex links and relationships.'10 He had difficulties, for 
example, understanding phrases like 'my father's brother'. He jumped from one 
word to the next although both words appeared perfectly clearly to him. He 
couldn't grasp that the genitive case created a new meaning. Hypertext 
documents have exactly the same effect. Generally they are constructed in 
 
10  Lurija, 1992, ibid., p. 48.  
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such a way that single expressions are annotated. This becomes a problem 
when it prevents new meanings from emerging from the combination of 
annotated expressions within the mind of the reader. Remaining with our 
present example, while the reader is caused to focus onto the father or the 
brother as clickable objects, his or her imagination is cut off from the creation 
of the uncle. 
Inversions are as difficult to grasp for the electrified reader as they are for 
Sassezki. A sentence like 'I had breakfast after I had read the newspaper' 
requires that the first part is still present while the second part is being read. 
Sassezki always had the feeling that he had walked into a trap11—the same 
trap of linearity with which hyperspace awaits us behind the non-linear 
disguise of the screen it greets us from. The literature of the Gutenberg Galaxy 
owes a considerable portion of its artistic quality to the turning of succession 
into simultaneity. The opposite is the case in the hypertext: Here the 
simultaneous structure is pre-ordained—what remains for the reader is its 
dissolution into monotonous chains of succession. 
While normal linguistic understanding is made possible by the ability to 
'direct the synthesis and organisation of complex associations in one mesh of 
relations,'12 readers of the hypertext and people with brain-damage in the 
manner of Sassezki's have lost this ability as a result of war technologies. The 
result, as in the case of Lurija's tragic client, is mental aphasia. 
Precisely this would have been the solution for Schereschewski's problem. 
The neutralization of the emphasis necessary to create meaning—an emphasis 
retained by the memory of a text much to his disillusionment—makes the 
hypertext an ideal instrument of forgetting—a forgetting in the sense of Eco's 
Ars Oblivionalis13 which functions due to the latent evacuation of achieved 
recollection that slips away beyond the subject's control. 
Conclusion: Towards a New Poetics of Hypermedia 
 
11 Ibid., p. 121. 
12  Ibid., p. 113. 
13 PMLA 103 (1988), pp. 254-61.  
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Firstly by way of a brief summary: Techniques of storage cause 
recollection to degenerate due to the externalization of the act of remembering. 
The text is also a storage technique. It becomes a medium of recollection by 
becoming literary, i.e. by the opening of intertextual spaces that can be filled-
in according to the reader's imagination. Hypertexts are structured in such a 
way that they upturn this literary function: The empty spaces of the intertexts 
become filled by the positivity of a new textual building-block. With each step 
through the 'web of trails', the hypertext reader flattens out the virtually 
inspiring dynamics that arise from the experience of the contradiction between 
a given static texture and its gaps. 
If, however, as we can observe in the phenomenon of literary 
intertextuality, the text is in a position to overcome the inclusions of storage 
techniques by transcending itself, we may ask whether the hypertext is capable 
of doing the same. I am convinced that a technique of recollection can be 
developed in the hyperspace, too. Its precondition is a new theory of 
intermediality. This should not, however, be confused with multimediality. 
Intermediality is the deconstruction of multimediality just as intertextuality is 
the deconstruction of textuality. The hypertext in its current form reverses this 
deconstruction by technically positivizing its virtuality by making it a real 
object. A new form of using it in the sense of a poetics of remembering has as 
yet not been attempted. The task is again to transform virtual reality into real 
virtuality  